As summarized in the LRN memo,
some of the most serious weaknesses and mis-steps include:
• Rail project personnel apparently neglected to coordinate closely early on with the FRA, although it had been clear for more than a decade that, because of CMTA's freight railroad operations, there would be regulatory involvement by the FRA.
• The issue of comprehensive regulatory oversight of the rail project was not resolved at the outset – a situation that was certainly not helped by some confusion introduced by federal and state regulatory officials. However, it should have been clear that some measure of federal regulatory oversight would need to be settled, including some degree of intervention by the FRA. In any case, because of this confusion, some key design elements of the MetroRail project were initially not adequately coordinated in a cooperative relationship with any appropriate regulatory agency, such as the FRA – particularly crucial, as it turned out, especially in regard to rolling stock selection and signal system requirements.
• Lack of experience with the actual challenges and requirements of rail transit projects may have contributed to the serious under-estimation of the projected investment cost of the "urban commuter rail" project presented to the public. This budget under-estimation then became a constraint, since the project team did not want to appear to be exceeding the established budget as the project progressed and other unforeseen requirements emerged.
• Some of the capabilities of DMU technology (as a replacement for electric LRT as the technology for a future urban system) seem to have been misjudged – particularly in regard to the reduced capability of DMUs to operate in an urban street environment (e.g., turning radius constraints), their lower acceleration compared with electric LRT (and the adverse impacts of this drawback on schedules in closely spaced station stops), and their limitations in climbing grades as steep as those of electric LRT (and thus the impact of this limitation on route profiles, such as approaches to hills and bridges). By far, however, the most serious mis-step in terms of rolling stock was the failure to initially coordinate rolling stock selection with the FRA and its regulations affecting the railway alignment to be used.
• One of the most critical features of the CMTA railway is an at-grade, interlocking-protected "diamond" crossing of the heavy-traffic north-south main line of the Union Pacific Railroad (UPRR) at McNeil Junction, north of Austin, and CMTA rail project designers proposed for the MetroRail alignment to retain this level crossing. Despite skepticism voiced by knowledgeable rail supporters (including leading representatives of the Light Rail Now Project), the need for a grade separation with the UPRR was initially rejected, and continued reliance on an interlocking-protected, at-grade crossing was assumed. As it turned out, this may have contributed to the under-estimation of the ultimate investment cost of the project.
• Although it eventually became clear that a grade-separation (viaduct) over the UPRR was truly necessary, the narrow, single-track viaduct design that emerged omitted any provision for a future double track, thus incorporating a serious capacity constraint.
• Ultimately, the segment of the MetroRail viaduct over the surface grade of the UPRR and a parallel siding was constructed approximately 18 inches (457mm) too low for adequate clearance of the interchange tracks – in turn necessitating the lowering of one of the underlying tracks, incurring drainage problems and substantial additional costs.
• MetroRail sidings – to enable passing of trains in opposing directions on a predominantly single-tracked alignment – appear to have been improperly located, thus adversely impacting the system's schedules and capacity.
• At some point into the project, in the effective absence of coordinated, systemwide project management, the project became split into at least three somewhat independent activities – civil, information technology (IT), and operations – subject to very poor coordination.
• In 2006, approximately two years into the project, the decision was made (apparently at the behest of the FRA) to dispense with plans for a simpler system of train movement control, and to implement a safer, more industry-standard centralized traffic control (CTC) system. However, Installation of the CTC signal system, together with level crossing protection controls, seems to have been poorly coordinated, with different contractors reportedly implementing incompatible components in different segments of the line. Furthermore, according to the LRN analysis, signal system components were initially improperly installed – for example, poor insulation reportedly made the system vulnerable to rainwater infiltration.
Re: Amtrak to San Antonio?
Originally Posted by ou48A
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